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TWO QUESTIO S ANSWERED
It is difficult for inhabitants of a consistently unified
country to form an adequate mental picture of the present
state of military unrest in China. Among the medley of
warring military leaders '}'hose names travel rather
meaninglessly abroad to further confuse the newspaper
reading public, interested individuals may well ask-"But
which one is the central force, which the rebel?"
And there is another fre uently asked question, concerning issues: "Why are t e people of the various sections of China constantly str Iggling against each other?"
The answers to both the e questions are short.
the first "Neither." To the second "They are not."

To

To which seeming paradox this is the explanation:

I

.

(1) There is no centra\ authority in China which
can be regarded as authentically such; there is merely
a temporary regime instit~ted by the force of one
military leader or another according to the fortunes
of battle, and having only a very slightly extensive
power, either in point of time or area. Each military
leader consequently names his opponents "rebels"
and himself the saviour and would-be unifier of
China-the "National Army," or central force.
(2) There are no real issues which concern the
people closely in these manifold warrings. Therefore, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ARE NOT
ENGAGING IN THESE STRUGGLES. When I sav
"the people" I mean those who are not officials or
would-be-officials or ex-officials-and many as there
are in the latter classes, still the people themselves
number vastly more thousands! And it is true that
the people themselves are not greatly concerned.
They are not a disunited people or a people incapable
of unification as many observers are fond of stating.
There are no causes of quarrel, fundamentally, between the provinces in which Wu Pei-fu is supreme
and those in which Feng Yu-hsiang has held sway;
or between either of those and the people of Canton,
or the areas farther west. The wars are leaders'
wars, and are waged for personal power and control,
almost invariably with little to choose between the
combatants.
The leaders are supported in their warfare by a
mercenary or an impressed soldiery, and by funds
levied as tax upon the merchants of the areas they
control. A mercenary army is an understand~ble
thing in China, where it is drawn from those. sectwns
of a dense population whic are already facmg star-
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vation and which welcome even the precarious life
of a soldier as a more certain means of subsistence.
The essential point in answer number two is,
therefore, that there is no real division between the
people of North and South, Coast or Inland provinces.
And the problem of the unification of China is, then,
the problem (by no means a simple one) of ridding
herself of her warring militarist leaders.
GEOGRAPHICAL CAUSE FOR DISUNITY
It is ·not easy for people living in a country so closelyknit as America, a country of even mental unification
where every morning the people of one State know precisely .what the people of ·their farthest-removed sisterState have been doing in the few hours since the last news
edition-it is not easy for people of such an environment
and mental habit to comprehend China and the degree of
her disunion.
But that disunion is almost wholly
physical in character. Perhaps we may come nearer to
an understanding of the situation if we think of our own
thirteen colonies and states before the days of train and
telegraph, and the disunity that then prevailed from geographical conditions and social diversities.

Consider a country with an area estimated at five
million square miles, of which only the four hundred
linear miles of coast territory are in any sense well connected or easily accessible one part to another by rail,
telegraph or water. Consider the huge interior area which
is only sparsely and imperfectly touched by telegraph,
where railroads do not exist, where the laborious travel
by small river boat, cart or camel-train is made more
uncertain and difficult by the natural obstacles of turbulent rivers, rapids, ·floods, great mountain barriers, poor
roads.
Under such conditions it is scarcely reasonable to
expect the people of Kansu Province, or . of distant
Szechuan, which border on the Tibetan wastes and are
months distant from Peking, to know of, much less comprehend and conform to, edicts from the temporary
authority at Peking! And without the thought-unity that
comes from a close news-intercouse it is a very difficult
matter for a republican government to function over wide
areas.
During the Empire these distant provinces enjoyed a
remarkably autonomous regime-under the governorship
of an imported Manchu staff, it is true, and paying taxes
to Peking, but otherwise practically cut off from central
authority,' certainly cut off from participation in extra-
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provincial affairs or any constraint thereto. The removal
of even a corrupt and tottering Imperial power, with no
strong or organized force for its immediate replacement,
could not, even though the agency be termed Revolution
and the form Republic, bring about an instant conformity throughout a territory of vast distances and physical barriers. It did but increase the sense of local
autonomy by removing the semblance of central authority and failing to remove the local Big Men, their armies
or their ambitions.
PROVINCES BUT PAWNS
Out of such a beginning China's fifteen years of nonmonarchial existence have been filled with an intensification of inter-provincial warfare, manoeuvered by varying
combinations of military power,-a warfare which has
hampered and rendered well-nigh impossible the constructive efforts of nation and government builders. And
there again the term. "inter-provincial" is misleading, for
the provinces are but pawns in the hands of the militarists-impressed suppliers of men and money for the
armies, not truculent participants of themselves. While
the leaders themselves,-old military governors, or
bandit generals, or upstarts from· the ranks, whatnotare each pursuing his own personal dream of uniting all
China under his own leadership; and to that end attempting to "pacify" his own particular provincial stronghold
and consolidate his immediate neighbors under his command. The difficulty of each lies in the fact that "consolidation" means absorption of other lesser powers into
his own; and in an atmosphere of personal ambitions,
constrained subordination, individual jealousies, it is nonsense to look for or expect such things as loyalty and
trust among these enforced allies. A man is your ally
or your subordinate until he sees a chance to take steps
alone in his own direction, or an opportunity to gain
further toward his own objective in the service of your
rival. That is why it seems impossible that a decisive
war or even battle can be fought out in this mass of military unrest and intrigue.
It is, in fact, this very indecisiveness which is the curse
of the military situation today, and which, incidentally,
renders it so puzzling and incomprehensible to the casual
onlooker by reason of its continual shifting of face. No
general is ever honest-to-goodness "licked." None is ever
eliminated-unless he chances to be a rebelling subordinate who is unlucky enough to fall into his erstwhile
superior's clutches. Little does it count that day before
yesterday Wu and Feng drove Chang outside the Great
Wall, for yesterday Feng turned around and let him in
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again and together they drove Wu into hiding; and today
Chang and Wu have joined forces to castigate the toopresumptuous Feng. Tomorrow-what?
FOREIGN AID TO MILITARY CONTESTANTS
A further element, intensifying the indecisiveness, has
in the past been the ability of warring factions to secure
the sinews of war from one or another of the foreign
powers-some Chinese patriots say because it was to the
interests of the powers to maintain a weak, unstable, impotent China as the field for their enterprises. Some even
say it has been a well-known policy for one Power to help
finance two belligerents at the same time. It is likewise
conceded by many of these same patriots that foreign
subsidization alone does not keep the militarists solvent
and functioning. The wealth of China herself is year
after year scrunched within the mailed paws of the militarists-and the merchants under their domination seem
helpless to withhold.
These same foreign Powers are fond of saying officially-"If China does this and that," or "If the Chinese
people stop their domestic quarrelling ... " as if there is
at present · any functioning unit known as China which
can issue and enforce an ultimatum; as if the Chinese
people had anything to do with this incessant warring!
The people themselves do nothing but suffer at the hands
of the military under whose regime they exist-lose peace,
prosperity, actual property, even lives in the wake of
battles which do not otherwise concern them and which
never settle anything. They are heartily wearied of the
endless game; but so far, because there is little ease of
communication between them there has been little possibility of concerted action in self-defense.
In some such concerted action, however, lies what looks
like China's only hope of freeing herself from that incubus, the Tuchun or military governor. And the fact that
the people themselves are not divided by these strugglesthat in fact they loathe all militarists with an impartial
loathing-is the one element that renders the situation
hopeful.
THE "BIG THREE"
It is true that amongst the present Big Three who,
first in one combination and then another, manipulate all
the many lesser generals of Central, Western and Northern China in an incessant struggle for control, public
opinion differs in its estimate, and some people incline to
one and ' some to another as "the least bad." On the
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whole, Wu Pei-fu has the odds in the popular favor-but
chiefly as an individual, not as a leader of armies, as a
civil administrator, or as a possible savior of China. He
holds this lead by reason of his unimpeachable personal
honesty (witness his comparative poverty and simplicity
of life), by his unquestioned (if misguided) patriotism,
and not least by reason of his strict bearing as a traditional hero, a Confucian ethicist of the classical type.
On the other hand, the less conservative-minded of
Young China are inclined to hold Feng Yu-hsiang as more
modern, more nationalistic, more plastic, less the rigid
conformist of the old fashion-in short, more hopeful as
a potential doer of constructive things. Personally he
is almost universally disliked, despised even, because of
his unstability and unaccountability; but he has made a
grand bid for popular suffrance in disciplining an army
which does not prey upon the countryside it inhabits, and
a ' still stronger bid for favor among participants in the
nationalist movement by declaring boldly for a People's
Army to :fight China's battles against foreign aggression
- a safe enough gesture.
It is safe to say that except among power-seekers,
Chang Tso-lin is practically anathema. He is probably
the most efficient and powerful militarist of them all,
and with seeming taste for efficient government as well,
as exemplified in Manchuria. But, strong man or not,
honest man or not, he had his beginning as a bandit, a
common "hung-hu-tze," and that the long memory of the
Chinese people can neither forget nor forgive.

This division of popular opinion can scarcely be said
to go to the lengths of voluntary support, for all three
men are considered enemies of the public peace and of
constructive development. Yet strangely enough, the
force of public like or dis like, while it cannot stem the
tide of warfare can do much in swaying its success. So
it means much to a leader to gain any degree of popular
favor or suffrance, and he will take great pains to announce his plans and principles in populace-currying
terms, or even, when convenient, to do constructive smallscale works for the same purpose.
CHINA'S ONE HOPE
But in the long run, despite his efforts and his highsounding phrases, he gains little real popular favor. His
deeds too greatly belie his words. Everywhere as a result
the populace joins in futilely cursing the military. They
suffer from victors and vanquished alike. And now there
is a growing movement for making this popular cursing
less futile,-a movement to translate it into action and
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crystallize it into effectivity. So far the movement seems
small and impotent, it is true, when compared with the
vast field over which it has to work. But there were even
smaller and more insignificant beginnings for that other
amazing movement which fifteen years ago overthrew an
Empire, in a tradition-loving land where Empire had for
thousands of years existed. And both movements found
or are findin g their beginnings in the fiery-spirited, determined stud ent-class. Today this student-cl ass is more
widespread and m ore embracing than was its prototype
of fi f teen or twenty years ago.
If tha t other miracle co ul d have happened (even poorly
managed as it may have been) wh o can say that the
·seemin gly hopeless m uddl e of present-day militari sm in
China may not a lso be resolved, unexpectedly and completely. Come when it may, certain ly that miracle could
never be branded as "premature," as the earlier has sometimes been!

Let China's self-conscious youth get solid ly behind
the slogan "Down With Militarists!" and I for one h ave
faith in their ultimate achievement. It is China's one
hope,-and a by no means hopeless one!
Report submitted by
ELIZABETH GREEN.
Rep resen tati ve in China.

Peking, China, February, 1926
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